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Гавайские острова (тихий ок., сша)
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Hawaiian, английский
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Gallipoli, английский
The dardanelles campaign of 1915 was the first modern amphibious operation and introduced a number of innovations. however, with the exception of its closing episode, it was a classic example of how not to run an invasion. in his book gallipoli (macmillan 1956) alan morehead says: no similar exploit in the past bore any real comparison ... or had had to face such entrenched positions ... the only operation that could be compared with this lay thirty years ahead on the beaches of normandy in the second world war; and planning the normandy landing was to take not three weeks but nearly two years. nevertheless, the operation began encouragingly with feint attacks on 25th april 1915, one of which found the key strategic height of achi baba virtually undefended— but the troops’ orders were only to create a diversion, so they made no attempt to seize it, staying put until ordered to withdraw. amid a welter of mismanagement the main attacks were made by british and french troops on the tip of the peninsula, and by australians & new zealanders (anzacs) at its narrow neck. after four months bogged down in trench warfare near the beachheads, allied c-in-c sir ian hamilton mounted a new landing at suvla bay a few kilometers north of anzac cove. for the first time in amphibious warfare using purpose-built, self-propelled, armored landing craft instead of cutters and whalers towed by steam pinnaces. the new divisions had been hastily-trained for static warfare on the western front, where as little as fifty meters was considered a significant advance, while in command was general stopford, who had never led troops in battle and had been retired for fifteen years. with the old-and-outdated leading the youngand- inexperienced, no one seems to have understood the urgency of rushing to secure a defensible perimeter on high ground. stopford allowed the first wave to swim and sunbathe on the beach while waiting for the rest to land. they too were soon stalemated. with all his beachheads pinned down. hamilton planned to open a new front on the plain of troy with six combat-ready divisions from france. however, they were diverted to salonika, and the blow was exacerbated when three of the divisions already on gallipoli were ordered to salonika as well. in october, hamilton was replaced by general sir charles monro, who made a unilateral decision to withdraw. winston churchill bitterly paraphrased julius caesar, “he came, he saw, he capitulated!” the troops had to be lifted from open beaches, during bad weather, in waters suitable for u-boat attack, while exposed to the close-range fire of an undefeated enemy. planners predicted a minimum casualty rate of 30 percent, with a high probability of exceeding 50 131 gallipoli percent. hospitals in egypt were alerted to prepare for at least thirty thousand casualties. thanks to meticulous planning by australian general william birdwood, effective cooperation between naval and military, ingenious deception devices, and a short break in the weather, anzac cove and suvla bay were evacuated in mid–december with no soldiers killed, and only two lightly wounded. at cape hellas, neither the enemy nor the weather was so cooperative. nevertheless, casualties were far fewer than expected. the german general staff called the evacuation “a military feat without equal.” the objective of forcing the straits, knocking turkey out of the war, reinforcing russia, and bringing balkan states in on the allied side was a far-sighted strategic concept which should have been attainable— the official turkish war history said, “if sir ian hamilton had been given six divisions instead of four at the outset, the invading troops could have forced the straits.”
Галилейское море; см. tiberias, sea of, русский
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